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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with the effect of market structure on the rate of 
extraction of a natural resource’ and on the date of innovation of a 
substitute. It can be thought of as making a contribution to three separate 
bodies of literature : 
(a) The Theory of Resource Extraction. In the model we present there 
exists a produced substitute’ to the natural resource. The primary question 
with which we are concerned is the interaction of the resource and its 
substitute. The model we present can thus be thought as providing a link 
between rent and production-based price theories. 
One of the general results in the earlier literature on resource extraction is 
that deposits with lower extraction costs will be exploited first. The analysis 
* This paper was completed while Stiglitz was Oskar Morgenstern Distinguished Research 
Fellow at Mathematics and visiting professor at the Institute for Advanced Study. We are 
most grateful to Richard Gilbert for useful discussions. Financial support from the National 
Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. This is a revised version of parts of Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz [6]. 
’ The classic discussion of the theory of resource extraction is Hotelling. See also the 
Review of Economic Studies Symposium [4] and Dasgupta and Heal [5]. 
* This substitute is sometimes referred to as a “backstop” technology. Earlier discussions of 
the effect of the presence of the backstop technology on resource extraction can be found in 
Stiglitz [22] and Dasgupta and Heal [4]. 
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of this paper extends that result; in both competition and monopoly 
situations, all the resource is extracted before production of this new 
commodity is initiated. This seems to leave unexplained the observation that 
in many cases, substitutes have been produced prior to exhaustion of the 
resource. The model of limited competition presented in Section 7 does, 
however, provide an explanation of this phenomenon.3 Thus, although both 
polar forms of market organization, competition and monopoly, are produc- 
tively efficient, mixed modes (limited competition) may not be. 
(b) The Theory of Innovation. The “substitute” can be thought of as a 
new commodity (or an old commodity, the cost of production of which has 
just been dramatically reduced). It is widely recognized that the existence of 
a supply of a natural resource which is a substitute for the new commodity 
will lead to a delay in the introduction of the new commodity. (Indeed, this 
delay, which reduces the present discounted value of returns to doing 
research, has been the subject of some concern, that it provides a 
discouragement to undertaking research for the development of substitutes.) 
The second question with which this paper is concerned is characterizing this 
delay, both in competitive and non-competitive situations. 
Although our concern with natural resources imposes a very specific 
structure on the problem, the analysis can be shown to be of much greater 
generality; if, instead of the “stock of natural resource” one thinks of “the 
stock of (old) machines employing the old technology,” the problem of “how 
fast should the old machines be depreciated before the new technology is 
introduced” is formally equivalent to the problem analyzed here.4 
(c) The Theory of Market Structure. The questions of the effect of 
monopoly both on the rate of extraction and on the timing of innovation 
have been subject to considerable discussion in the literature. 
In the literature, one can find arguments that competition provides an 
inducement to innovation or, on the contrary, that at least some degree of 
monopoly is conducive to innovation (e.g., Schumpeter). Similarly, there is a 
widespread view that monopolies of natural resources may be excessively 
profligate (i.e., use resources too rapidly), and there is the contrary view that 
they are charging excessively high prices, and are thus being excessively 
conservationist. The arguments are complex and we cannot do justice in this 
3 Alternative explanations, based on technological characteristics, on capacity constraints, 
on demand characteristics (the different commodities are not perfect substitutes), or on 
imperfect capital markets ( a country with high-cost oil may not be able to borrow on the 
basis of future revenues), are clearly possible. 
4 There are some important differences prior to invention, and some technical differences 
between modeling the depreciation of a pre-existing stock of capital and the depletion of a pre 
existing stock of natural resource. 
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brief article to the various strands5 The model we formulate does, however, 
provide precise answers to these questions. 
In particular, we shall show that monopolies are excessively 
conservationist,6 in the sense that, at least initially, consumption of the 
natural resource is lower with monopoly than with competition, and that 
innovation occurs at a later data with monopoly than with competition. 
There is another sense of “more conservationist,” focusing on the date at 
which the resource is finally exhausted. (In the interpretation of the model 
which focuses on conventional goods produced by machines, the date of final 
exhaustion can be thought of as the date of final phasing out of the obsolete 
technology.) One of the other interesting results of our analysis is that this 
second sense may not coincide with the first; in one of the market structures 
examined, although the initial price is lower than the monopoly price, the 
date of exhaustion is later. 
Finally, we turn to the question of examining the effect of limited (or 
monopolistic) competition’ on the allocation of resources. The analysis of 
markets in which firms have some limited degree of market power, less than 
pure monopoly but more than pure competition, has recently been the 
subject of a number of studies (Spence [20], Dixit and Stiglitz [ 111, Salop 
[ 181). The market equilibrium which emerges in these models looks 
considerably different from either of the polar cases on which so much 
attention has been focused. 
This suggests that further investigation of “mixed models” is likely to be 
fruitful. The models developed in this paper differ from most earlier models 
of imperfect competition in two significant ways. First, earlier literature on 
“imperfect” competition focused on models in which there were a few large 
firms (the theory of oligopoly), or in which there were a large number of 
small firms, each of whom had some limited market power (the theory of 
monopolistic competition). One of the distinguishing features of two of the 
models presented here is that there is one large firm and a large number of 
small extremely competitive firms.’ Secondly, most of the earlier models of 
imperfect competition were static. 9 Yet the competitive process is essentially 
dynamic, e.g., new commodities replacing old, and this paper is an attempt 
’ For instance, the Schumpterian argument depends critically on the existence of fixed costs 
associated with innovation, on problems associated with appropriability, and with the 
existence of imperfect capital markets. All of these considerations will be ignored in this 
paper. But see Dasgupta and Stiglitz [8, 91 and Stiglitz et al., [28]. 
6 The conditions under which these results obtain are given below. 
‘We prefer the term “limited” competition to the more prevalent term “imperfect” 
competition; as Stiglitz has argued [26], the traditional model of “perfect competition” does 
not really capture adequately the nature of competition in markets. 
a See also Gilbert [12]. 
9 Recent work on the theory of repeated games has shown how dramatically different 
results can be obtained with dynamic models. 
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to capture some aspects of the essential intertemporal nature of the 
interactions in imperfectly competitive situations. 
We are concerned here with two questions: First, is there a sense in which 
the properties of “limited competition” models can be thought of as lying 
between the “pure models” (pure competition, pure monopoly)? Our analysis 
casts some doubt on the traditional presumption, dating back at least to the 
work by Cournot [ 11, that limited competition lies between pure competition 
and pure monopoly: In one of the limited competition models examined, the 
initial price always lies between that which would have prevailed under 
competition and under pure monopoly. But in two models, the initial price 
exceeded both the competitive and the monopoly price. Moreover, in one 
model of limited competition that we examined (a duopoly model, in which 
the resource and the substitute are each owned by a single firm), the date of 
first innovation of the substitute preceded that of either the competitive 
equilibrium or the monopoly; the equilibrium for this model differed in a 
number of ways from both polar cases (see below, Section 7). 
Secondly, the presence of limited competition raises a number of new 
questions concerning interactions between the producer(s) of the two 
commodities, which simply do not arise in either of the polar cases. For 
instance, if the two producers co-exist, what determines market share? In 
Section 7, we provide an explicit solution for the determination of market 
share for the duopoly case. 
Perhaps more importantly, a cartel can force a delay in innovation, in the 
entry by the competitive rivals with access to the new technology, by 
restricting the rate of extraction and therefore delaying the date of resource 
exhaustion. Whether it is in its interest to do so is a question we investigate 
in Section 6. (The answer is, under fairly general conditions, yes.) 
Likewise, a monopolist owner of the substitute technology might lower his 
price (below his long run monopoly price), in order to “drive down” the 
price of resources, thus encouraging the exhaustion of the resource and 
hastening the date at which the patent holder can enjoy a monopoly position. 
In Section 5 we show that this is in fact the case, but that he only engages in 
this to a limited extent: as a consequence, the market equilibrium price turns 
out to be still higher than it would have been, had the substitute been 
competitively owned (thus the competitive owners of the resource benefit 
from the granting of a patent on the rival technology). 
In what follows we shall study five distinct market structures: (I) where 
both the resource and the substitute technology are competitively owned; (II) 
where a single agent controls both; (III) where the resource is competitively 
owned but the substitute is protected by a patent; (IV) where the resource 
has been cartelized but the substitute is competitively exploited; and (V) 
where the resource is owned by a cartel and the substitute is protected by a 
patent owned by an agent other than the cartel, (the duopoly case). 
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It may be useful, before beginning our analysis, to attempt to relate this 
study to several other recent studies of natural resources. 
Stiglitz (251 established that if the elasticity of demand were constant and 
greater than unity and extraction costs were nil, then monopoly and 
competition were identical; if the elasticity of demand increased with output, 
and/or if extraction costs were positive, the monopoly was more conser- 
vationist than the competitive market. The results reported here can be 
thought of as extending these results to a more complicated set of 
technologies and market structures.” 
In this paper, we do not ask what is the effect of the possibility of 
discovering a substitute on the rate of extraction prior to discovery. We 
begin our analysis with the discovery already made. The effect of the uncer- 
tainty about the date of discovery on the rate of extraction before invention 
is analyzed in Dasgupta and Stiglitz [lo] for competitive markets and in 
Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1271 for non-competitive market structures. 
In this paper as well as the two papers referred to in the previous 
paragraph, we take the date of discovery as exogenous. But one of the 
primary reasons for examining the equilibrium in different market structures 
is that it affects the profitability of innovation, and hence the date of 
discovery. 
Hence, this study can be thought of as a prelude to the sequel (Stiglitz et 
al. [28]), in which expenditures on R & D, patterns of extraction, dates of 
invention and innovation and pricing policy are examined simultaneously 
under various market structures. 
Finally, market structure itself should be viewed as endogenous, deter- 
mined in part by the costs associated with innovation, the uncertainty 
associated with R & D, and the legal structure. Dasgupta and Stiglitz ([ 8, 91) 
developed a model in which market structure, invention, and innovation are 
all endogenous. 
2. THE BASIC MODEL 
Let x, > 0 and y, > 0 denote respectively the rate of resource depletion and 
the flow of output from the substitute technology at date t (20). They are 
perfect substitutes in “consumption.” I1 Let Q, = x, + y,, total consumption. 
For ease of exposition we take it that demand for the commodity does not 
” For other studies of the effect of imperfect competition on resource depletion, see Salant 
[ 171, Sweeney [29], and Dasgupta and Heal [5, Chap. 111. These contain analytical results. 
For simulation studies, see Cremer and Weitzman [2], and Hnyilicza and Pindyck [ 131. 
” The commodity in question may be an input in production. In this case the demand for it 
is a derived demand. 
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shift with time. Let Q = D(p) (>O) denote the market demand function. We 
take it that D’ < 0. Let f(Q) = D-‘(Q) = p be the inverse demand function. 
A central case in our analysis is that where the demand curve has constant 
elasticity, 
Q=kp-’ (1) 
E is the (absolute value) of the elasticity of demand. As in any study of 
imperfect competition, we focus on the case where the elasticity exceeds 
unity, i.e., 6 > 1. 
With the usual provisos assume that social benefits can be measured by 
consumer surplus (from the market demand function). Consequently, gross 
social utility is 
u(Q) = 1" f(Q'> dQ'. 
0 
For the constant elasticity demand function, we obtain 
u(Q) =s Q1-. 
(2) 
(2’) 





Moreover, extraction costs are nil. But the commodity can as well be made 
available by exploiting the substitute technology at a unit cost of production 
p(>o).‘2 
Our concern here is with monopolistic competition among the suppliers of 
the commodity in question. Therefore we take it that the capital market is 
perfect and that the market rate of interest on the numeraire asset is r (>O). 
When the need arises (as it will in the following section), we shall identify r 
as well with the social rate of discount. Without loss of generality, we take 
k = ((E - I)/&)‘. 
‘* The substitute “technology” could, of course, be simply a reserve of the natural resource 
with higher extraction costs (p); the analysis here applies if the reserves are sufficiently large 
to drive rents close to zero. 
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3. THE COMPETITIVE MARKET 
This environment has been analyzed extensively, (see, e.g., Solow [ 191, 
Stiglitz [23 ] and [24] and Dasgupta and Heal [5]). We suppose that both 
the resource stock and the backstop technology are competitively owned. For 
our purposes here it will be best to obtain the characteristics of the intertem- 
poral competitive equilibrium path by regarding the outcome as the solution 
of a planner’s social optimization problem since we know, by the 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics, that the two are equivalent. The 
planner’s problem is to choose two programs x, and y, so as to maximize 





The solution of problem (3) is routine to establish. Let ps =f(Q,) be the 
(shadow) price of the commodity. Then we know that as long as the resource 
stock lasts, price must rise at the rate of interest 
We can now describe the competitive equilibrium outcome in the form of 
PROPOSITION 1. The intertemporal competitive equilibrium consists of 
two phases. During an initial interval (0, P), yt = 0 and x, > 0 (i.e., the 
resource is exploited and the backstop technology is held in abeyance). 
During (0, rS) the resource price satisfies Eq. (4). At T” the resource is 
exhausted and innovation occurs. The initial price and the innovation date Ts 
are related by the conditions 
For t 2 T the backstop technology is in use, and the commodity is supplied 
at the price p (see Fig. 1). 
The important result of Proposition 1 is that resource exhaustion precedes 
technological innovation. T” is the optimum date of innovation. Now this is 
not to say that resource exhaustion is the cause of innovation. Were the 
substitute technology not to be made available to society by Ts the resource 
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FIGURE 1 
would not be exhausted at Ts along a competitive equilibrium. It is precisely 
because the substitute technology is available that society finds it rational to 
exhaust the resource at P.13 
4. PURE MONOPOLY 
This is the other polar case and is equally simple to characterize. It is 
supposed that a single firm both owns the resource stock and has a patent on 
the substitute technology. The motivation for analyzing this case is not solely 
because it is the direct generalization of the more conventional case of 
monopoly production, but also because the analysis is relevant for 
investigating the incentives that a resource cartel has for developing 
substitute products behind entry barriers. 
Let R(Q) = u(Q) denote gross revenue for the monopolist. Then the 










It is clear at once that the monopolist will not innovate prior to resource 
exhaustion. Moreover, as there are no extraction costs, the monopolist will 
so regulate his extraction that while stocks last, marginal revenue rises at the 
rate of interest, 
hi,/JM, = r, (6) 
I3 This has an important bearing on the interpretation of certain historical episodes. For 
contrasting views of the “energy crisis” in 16th century England, see Nef [ 161 and Steinmuller 
1211. The analytical issues are discussed in Dasgupta and Stiglitz [6]. 
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FIG. 2. 7” is the date of innovation. 
where 
WQ) = R'(Q). 
The intuition behind (6) (which we shall find useful later) is that the 
monopolist must be indifferent between extracting a unit more at t, receiving 
an additional presented discounted value of revenue of M(Q() Crt, and 
selling a unit less at some later date, E reducing the present discounted value 
of revenues then by M(Qr) eeri, i.e., 
must be the same for all 1, from which (6) immediately follows. 
The long run price (after all the resource is extracted) is that where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, 
or 
-f (Q,> 
'* = Q,f'<Q,> ' 
We can thus establish 
PROPOSITION 2a. The monopolist’s optimal sales policy consists of two 
phases. During the first phase he holds the substitute technology in abeyance 
and controls the rate of extraction in such a way as to ensure that this 
marginal revenue grows at the rate of interest. He chooses the initial price in 
such a way that at the date market price equals the long-run monopoly price, 
the entire stock is exhausted. At this date the monopolist innovates and 
enters the second phase in which the product is sold at the long-run monopoly 
price, jL5*/(e* - 1). 
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If the demand curves have constant elasticity, we know that marginal 
revenue is proportional to market price. Let pI WI’ denote the price charged by 
the monopolist. Then Eq. (6) reduces to 
$r;2fpy = r. (6’) 
Although (6’) and (4) are identical, this does not mean to say that the 
monopolist extracts at rates that are socially optimal. The two markets differ 
in “boundary conditions”: on innovating, the monopolist will charge the 
monopoly price, F&/F - 1 > @, the long-run price of the social planner. Thus 
the monopolist’s price exceeds the socially optimal price throughout, and the 
monopolist’s rate of resource exploitation is more conservative at each date. 
This effect is reinforced if the elasticity of demand decreases with Q. It is 
now easy to establish 
PROPOSITION 2b. If 
c'(Q) < 0, P’: > Pi> sr > s;, 
for all t, $“/p@’ < r and T” > T”. 
Similarly, if we let pm(S) be the equilibrium monopoly price when the 
stock of the resource is S, p’(S) be the competitive equilibrium price when 
the stock of the resource is S and Tm(S,) and T”(S,) be the innovation dates 
as a function of the initial stock, then we can establish’4*1s 
I4 The proof is straightforward. From Eq. (6) we have 
= p +c?uL dInM 






-& > 0. $ > r. 
W’ Wdt --=- 
dS dS/dt (I-&- 1)Q 
dp’ pr 
dS Q 
” If speculators can buy the natural resource and store it, the monopolist is constrained to 
price-quantity trajectories for which d/p < r. Then the case of E’(Q) > 0 is identical to that 
with c: constant. 
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P 





9 4 s 
FIG. 3. E’ > 0: For large S monopoly is excessively profligate. 
PROPOSITION 2c. If e’(Q) > 0, there exists critical values of the initial 
stock, s and $, 0 < 3 < f?, such that 
(see Fig. 3). 
For the central case of constant elasticity, monopoly is not only 
excessively conservationist, but innovation is delayed (corroborating the view 
that monopoly discourages innovation; but see Stiglitz et al. [28]). This 
result extends to the case of E’ < 0, and, for small initial stocks of the 
resource, to E’ > 0; but just the opposite happens if E’ > 0 and S is large. 
The monopolist’s fault lies not in the fact that he holds a sleeping patent 
during the first phase; for we concluded in Section 3 that the existence of a 
new technology is not an argument for introducing it. His fault lies rather in 
allowing the patent to sleep for too long. I6 
Although our primary concern in this paper is with the effect of market 
structure on the price of a natural resource and patterns of extraction, for a 
given stock of the natural resource and a given price of the substitute, we are 
also concerned with the incentives, under each of the market structures 
examined, for changes in the available stock of resources, as a result of 
additional explorations, or changes in the date of invention, as a result of 
increased expenditures on R & D. In non-competitive environments, these 
incentives are related to, for instance, the marginal revenue obtained by a 
resource owner from an additional unit of the resource at any particular 
date. Thus, in our later analysis, the following result, which may be derived 
immediately from our earlier discussion, is of some use: 
I6 It is easy enough to confirm that Proposition 2b holds if we introduce a small positive 
unit cost of extraction. 
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PROPOSITION 2d. For all S,, if d(Q) < 0 
M;<P; all t. 
If e’(Q) > 0, 
‘44” < t >p: all t as S, >’ 3. 
The result follows from observing that at Tm, 
M” =ji, 
while at T’ 
and both increase exponentially at the rate r until T = T” (T = T”). 
Assume that the expected cost of discovering a unit of the natural resource 
is ct ; assume, moreover, that c1 increases with t, and, in particular, that it 
increases at a rate faster than r.l’ Then, it is immediate that the amount of 
exploration with monopoly is less than is socially optimal if E’ < 0. 
5. COMPETITIVE RESOURCE OWNERS AND MONOPOLY PRODUCER 
Consider a resource that is competitively owned, and suppose that the 
substitute technology is protected by a patent. To keep the analysis tidy we 
take it that the patent is of infinite duration. Interest in this form of market 
structure lies in the fact that it sets the stage for an exploration of decen- 
tralized search for a substitute product under the provision that the winner 
takes all. 
We now need to develop a dynamic game equilibrium for this market 
structure. The natural equilibrium concept is that of von Stackelberg. Since 
resource owners are competitive and since we shall hypothesize the existence 
of forward markets the percentage rate of change in the resource price can 
never exceed r. This is a constraint that the patent holder must observe in the 
process of price setting. (In the absence of futures markets, important 
problems of dynamic consistency arise.) 
It is conceptually simplest to analyze the game equilibrium by supposing 
“This way of modeling exploration costs does not do full justice to the technology of 
exploration: we should also make c, depend on, for instance, previous discoveries. What this 
formulation does capture, however, is the fact that exploration and extraction can occur at 
distinctly different times. (With exploration costs, the natural resource becomes like a 
“produced good”; there still, of course, may be rents associated with its production.) 
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that the patent holder purchases the entire resource stock at the initial data 
and consequently determines the rate of extraction. But, as we have already 
noted, he can exercise only partial control. 
Let p, denote the equilibrium price at t. Then the equilibrium path 
generated in this imperfectly competitive market is obtained from the 
solution of the following problem: 
subject to (7) 
S,=S,- ‘x~dr;~~randx,,g,,S,aO. 
I 0 
Problem (7) is of an unusual form, though it can be solved rather readily. 
It differs from problem (5) (the case of the pure monopolist) in precisely two 
ways. First, there is an additional cost item (the purchase of the resource 
from the competitor owners) in the patent holder’s profit function. Second, 
there is a constraint on the rate at which he can raise prices. Now we noted 
in Proposition 2b that the resource price never rose at a rate greater than r 
along the solution to problem (5) if E’ < 0. One might have thought then that 
the constraint on the price in problem (7) is really irrelevant. Not so. For 
suppose that the patent holder could ignore this constraint. The solution to 
(7) would then be immediate. He would set p’, = 0 and sell the entire stock at 
t = 0. This would enable him to get down to producing the substitute product 
right from the start and to sell it at the monopoly price. It is such a discon- 
tinuous jump in the price that is prohibited by the constraint. 
In Appendix A, we prove that, 
PROPOSITION 3a. The dynamic game equilibrium is characterized by the 
following properties: There exist PI and F2, with p2 > T, > 0, such that 
(i) &,/fit = r for 0 < t < T2 and I.& and r, are related by the condition 
Foe “I = E *p/( 1 - E *) (the long-run stationary price); 
(ii) 17, = c*p/(l - e*)fir t > F2;; 
(iii) during an initial interval (0, F,) the backstop is held in abeyance 
and only the exhaustible resource is marketed and at F, the entire stock of 
the resource is depleted. Consequently, 
(iv) during (r, , p2) the patent holder produces the substitute product 
and earns positive but less than the full monopoly proJt. (See Fig. 4a). The 
present discounted value of profits earned during (0, Y?,) equals $oSo. 




a O b” 
FIG. 4. TT, is the date of innovation. (a) Stackleberg equilibrium. (b) ~7~ > pi. 
Parts (i)-(iii) of Proposition 3a are obvious enough. The problem 
confronting the patent holder is one of devising the optimal procedure for 
driving his competitive rival out of business. Presumably he wants to 
announce a “low” sequence of prices for a time so as to encourage depletion, 
to hasten the day when he can be the sole producer of the commodity. He 
can do this best by allowing the market price to rise at the maximum rate 
consistent with dynamic equilibrium. 
It is part (iv) of Proposition 3a which requires justification. The argument 
establishing part (iv) of Proposition 3a can be presented diagrammatically. 
In Fig. 4a we bring together Fig. 1 and 2 on the supposition that each of the 
three systems initiates with the same stock S,, and the assumption that S, is 
“large” so that initial price under pure monopoly (Fig. 2) is less than p. If 
i0 > pf then T, (the date at which the resource gets depleted) exceeds T”. 
Since over the entire interval (0, pi) the patent holder earns no net profit, in 
setting PO >pT he would merely delay the date from which he can earn 
profits from the new technology. This argument by itself suggests that he 
would like to set fit, at a lower level. For, lowering the initial price brings 
nearer ?i,, the date at which he begins marketing his product. But bringing 
forward F1 also implies that for an interval of time the price at which he can 
sell his product is lowered. Thus, in comparing any two price paths we must 
compare the revenues corresponding to the shaded areas in Fig. 4b. The 
cross-hatched area in the figure shows the increased profits in the interval 
(F, , Tm) from having lowered the initial price from pt, and the striped area 
denotes the subsequent reduced profits. 
Note that as Y?, + T”‘, i?Z + T”, and both areas go to zero. Thus, to 
establish pr < r, requires a more subtle argument (see Appendix A). 
The next question is, will the patent holder set j0 <pi? The answer is, 
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“no.” For were he to set @,, < p A (so that T, < T) there is now an additional 
interval during which he absorbs a loss before p” reaches p and during the 
remaining period his profits are lower. These two arguments establish his 
optimal initial price, jO, at a level strictly between pi and p,“. 
The fact that &, >pi implies that the market value of the resource is 
higher if the substitute technology is awarded a patent than it would be were 
it competitively owned. Therefore, so far as the competitive resource owners 
are concerned, monopolization of the new technology is an advantage. Some 
of the benefits of the monopoly “trickles” down to the competitive resource 
owners. 
In establishing Proposition 3a we have also established” 
PROPOSITION 3b. (i) If elasticity of demand is constant, 
P: ( A ( PY for all t, 
Ts<T’,<T”<Tp 
(ii) us’(Q) < 0, 
(iii) Ifs’(Q) > 0 
If the resource is competitively owned, but the substitute is controlled by a 
monopolist, then if demand has constant elasticity the date of innovation and 
the date of exhaustion of the natural resource (which coincide) is later than 
is socially optimal, but earlier than for a pure monopolist, and the initial 
price always lies between the socially optimal price and the pure monopoly 
price. 
The case with non-constant elasticity demand curves is more complicated, 
and is discussed in Appendix A. The price is always greater than the socially 
optimal price; moreover, the date of innovation is later than is socially 
I8 If E’(Q) < 0, j”/m” < r, so if fiO >p:, Tm < f,, but pm(Tm) < ,?(F,) < < @/(I - &), 
contradicting Proposition 2a. 
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FIG. 5. Nash (quantity) equilibrium. 
optimal. The comparison with the pure monopoly is complicated by the fact 
that in pure monopoly, price may rise faster or slower than the rate of 
interest. 
The solution concept we have used here is the traditional Stackelberg 
leader (the monopolist)-follower (the competitive producers) model, which, 
at least in a temporal context, seems quite persuasive whenever there is a 
single dominant firm dealing with a large number of small rivals, who act as 
price-takers. An alternative, and we think in this context less persuasive 
solution concept, is the traditional Nash equilibrium quantity-taking 
equilibrium. Then we can establish 
PROPOSITION 3c. The Nash quantity-taking equilibrium is characterized 
by: 
(i) An initial phase during which prices rise (approximately) at the 
rate of interest and during which only the resource is extracted, 
(ii) a second phase, F, < t < f2,, during which prices lie between p 
and PE */(E* - 1) (the competitive and monopoly prices, respectively) and 
still rise at the rate of interest, but both the natural resource and the 
produced good are produced. The quantity produced satisjies the equation 
marginal revenue = pt 
c 
1 - (l-P,> 
E ) 
= p = marginal cost, 
where 1 -puI =fraction of output supplied by monopolist; and 
64212811-10 
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(iii) a third phase, t > p2 during which only the produced good is sold 
(q = 0, y< > O), and pt = p/( 1 - I/E *) (see Fig. 5). 
The argument is straightforward: For each of the competitors, who supply 
a negligible fraction of the market, price is approximately equal to marginal 
revenue; hence, so long as they sell, price must rise at the rate of interest. On 
the other hand, the monopolist produces to the point where his perceived 
marginal revenue equals his marginal cost. 
An immediate corollary of this result is: 
PROPOSITION 3d. In the Nash equilibrium: 
(i) 
P:: < A for all t. 
T, < T” < Tz ; 
the price always exceeds the socially optimal price; the date of innovation is 
earlier than in the social optimum; the date of exhaustion is later.” 
(ii) rfe’=O,~~~p~forallt~~~:, 
If the elasticity of demand is constant, the price is always less than the 
monopoly price, and the date of innovation is earlier, but the date of 
exhaustion is later. 
(iii) Zf e’(Q) < 0, fi,, < pr and F, < T”. If c’(Q) > 0, F2 > T”. 
The implications of the results for exploratory activity are immediate. 
Since the price is higher than in the social optimum, exploratory activity will 
be greater: some of the potential monopoly profits of the inventor will be 
eroded by exploratory activity. 
6. RESOURCE CARTEL AND COMPETITIVE PRODUCERS 
The problem analyzed in the previous section corresponds to the optimal 
procedure for a monopolist driving his competitive rivals out of the market. 
The case to be analyzed in this section is the opposite. Here the resource is 
I9 Assume pi >jO,. Then the date at which pS = p, T” > f’, , the date at which j( = p. But 
Z?f, > 0, while Sg, = 0. But since x: <2,,. this is impossible. Hence pi <A. It is thus 
immediate that T, < 7’“. Since j, >pi, and,q>Oforall ~,~f<~~,,x~>x,forallt~~,. 
Hence F2 > T (the data of exhaustion must be later). 
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managed by a cartel. The new technology is the competitive sector. The 
cartel obviously cannot keep these competitive rivals out of the market 
indefinitely. It can merely undercut them for a while. For, so long as the 
cartel produces at a sufftcient rate so as to keep the market price below p, 
competitive producers do not produce. They would suffer losses were they to 
do so. Nor can it ever hope to sell at a price in excess of @, for in this case 
the competitive rivals would undercut it. (This form of imperfect competition 
has been analyzed independently by Hoe1 [ 141.) 
Let PT be the price along the game equilibrium. Then the equilibrium 





e-“[R(x, + YJ - P~tl dt 
0 
subject to (8) 
S,=S,- ‘x,ds;x,,y,S,~0;andprfp 
I 0 
It will be noted that (8) differs from (5) only by the inclusion of the final 
constraint on the market price. The threat of entry by the competitive sector 
ensures that price never exceeds p. 
In Appendix B we prove that the equilibrium outcome can now be stated 
as: 
PROPOSITION 4a. There exist two instants TF and T$ (with 
T;” > Tf > 0) such that the cartel is the sole supplier to the market during 
(0, Tt). During (0, T,*) the cartel so controls supply that marginal revenue 
rises at the rate of interest, and that at T: price is 8. During (TF, TT), the 
cartel markets the remaining stock at the price fl. At T.f the stock is 
exhausted and the competitively owned backstop technology makes its 
FIG. 6. z is the date of resource exhaustion and technological innovation. 




















I I t 
C Tl* TZ* 
FIG. 7. (a) For large S, competition increases price. (b) Competitive ownership of 
substitute leads to earlier innovation. (c) Discontinuity in marginal revenue. 
appearance and for t & T,* the product is to be sold at J?. T;* > 0 as S, > 
- (f-‘(p)fr) In(1 - I/E). At T:, there is a discontinuous jump in marginal 
revenue; its present value at T2* is the same as during the interval (0, TF). 
(See Fig. 6 and 7.) 
The key feature of Proposition 4a (if one were to contrast it with 
Proposition 2) is the limit pricing phenomenon that prevails during 
(TT, T,*). It does not occur immediately in the economy here because we 
have postulated an elastic demand curve. If instead, demand were inelastic at 
prices less than ~7 it is clear that the limit price phenomenon would occur 
from the start (i.e., T: would be zero). 
The fact that TF > T: implies that the resource is depleted at a more 
conservative pace than in a fully competitive economy (Proposition l), and 
innovation occurs at a later date (see Fig. 1 and 6). 
It can also be established that if S is large enough (so pr < @), the initial 
price is greater than the initial monopoly price. To see this, observe that for 
all dates in the interval (0, TF), the present discounted value of the marginal 
revenue is constant. In addition, optimality requires that this be equal to the 
present discounted value of selling a unit more at Tt, i.e., pe-“*T. Assume 
p$ = p:. Then, at the date of exhaustion, the present discounted value of 
marginal revenue for the monopoly is 
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But 7”” would clearly exceed Q, and hence the value of the marginal 
revenue at time 0, 
Pi31 - l/E) 
must be less than pee- ‘*f Hence, it pays the firm to reduce extraction at time . 
0 (increase marginal revenue at time 0), which will increase EC, and hence 
lower the marginal revenue at the date of exhaustion. 
A similar argument can be used to show c < P. For assume q = T”. 
Then the present discounted value of marginal revenue, in both market 
structures, is peCrTi =jeerTm. But when the substitute is competitively 
produced, p;t’ > pt, and hence at t = 0, marginal revenue exceeds that in the 
pure monopoly; hence marginal revenue at t = 0 exceeds that at Tf. The 
result is immediate (See Fig. 7b.) 
It is obvious that for small S, where pr > p, pz < j! < p:. The relationship 
between the two, plotted as a function of S, is given in Fig. 7a. 
We summarize with 
PROPOSITION 4b.” 
(4 P:Pp”o if&’ < 0, 
P:: >PS all t ifs’ = 0, 
T,* > TS f&’ < 0, 
(b) PTiPF asS>,S* 9 
l.7 c T”, 
M,* > Mt. 
Note that in this model, the limited competition equilibrium price may be 
greater than both the monopoly price and the competitive equilibrium price. 
Competition increases marginal revenue. 
7. INTERTEMPORAL DUOPOLY EQUILIBRIUM 
A telling feature characterizing the equilibrium outcome of each of the 
four market structures” that we have so far analyzed is that resource 
exhaustion precedes technological innovation. In each the cheaper resource is 
” The proof of (a) is analogous to our proofs of earlier propositions. If  E’ < 0 price rises 
slower than the rate of interest. Hence, if p; <pi, the date of exhaustion must be earlier; in 
particular it must occur before pT = p, contradicting Proposition 4a. 
*’ With the exception of the Nash equilibrium solution to the model of Section 5. 
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supplied first. Transition from the exhaustible to the inexhaustible resource 
occurs sharply. Neither of these intuitively appealing characteristics are a 
feature of a duopoly equilibrium. 
Assume then that the resource has been cartelized and that the new 
technology is protected by a patent held by a rival. To simplify the analysis 
we take it that the patent is of infinite duration. The aim is to characterize an 
intertemporal Cournot-Nash equilibrium, i.e., we assume that each of the 
duopolists takes the quantities marketed by the other as given. A game 
equilibrium then requires that so long as the two supply the market 
simultaneously the perceived net marginal revenue to the resource cartel rises 
at the rate of interest and the perceived marginal revenue accruing to the 
patent holder equals ~7. This is the general property under which the rivals 
share the market. 
Thus, let pt be the fraction of total output, Q,, sold by the natural resource 
owner at t. For the resource owner, marginal revenue is given by 
while for the patent owner, it is 
PA1 - (1 -&Y&>- Pb) 
If 0 ( pt < 1, the marginal revenue of the resource owner must be rising at 
the rate of interest, i.e., 
-f - (L/E - (u/e)E’/e) & = r 
and the marginal revenue of the patent owner must be equal to his marginal 
cost, 
PU - (1 -co/&)=p. (lob) 
Manipulating (lOa) and (lob) yields 
h -=r 2 - l/E -p/p 
P 2 - l/E - v = VT 
(11) 
where v = Q&‘/E. (See Appendix C.) We assume v < 2 - l/s. Thus, 
provided v < 0, j/p < r, price rises slower than in competitive equilibrium; 
from the corresponding equation for the pure monopolist, we can show that 
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FIG. 8. (a) S, is large. T, is the date of innovation. Duopolists share the market during 
(T,, T2). T, is the date of resource exhaustion. T, - T, = -(Z/r) log(1 - 1,‘~)). (b) S, is 
small. Innovation occurs at I = 0. T, is the date of resource exhaustion. 
price rises more slowly than for a monopolist,” provided v is positive (or not 
too negative). 
We can use these results to prove 
PROPOSITION 5a. If S, is large, the duopoly equilibrium is characterized 
by three phases :
(a) During thefirst phase (0, T,), pt < p, the cartel is the sole supplier, 
and marginal revenue rises at the rate of interest. 
(b) During the second phase (T, , T,), p < p1 < p&*h/( 1 - E*), price is 
above the competitive price but below the pure monopoly price; the duopolists 
share the market, and the rate of change of price is given by (11). 
Exhaustion of the resource occurs at T,. 
(c) During fhe third phase, t> T,, p=p~*/(I -E*), only the 
substitute is produced; it is sold at the long-run monopoly price. See Fig. 8a. 
If S, is small, the first phase does not occur and innovation occurs at 
t = 0, as depicted in Fig. 8b. 
By using (1 l), we can calculate along the equilibrium path 
dpd dpldt vw --=--, 
dS - dS/dt PD(P) 
which can be compared to 
dpm rp 
dS=--’ D(P) 
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Since as p-‘pE*/(~* - l), the long-run monopoly price, ~1-, 0 while 
iy-’ 1/((2& - 1)/E) - V 
We can be more precise. In Appendix D we show that for the constant 
elasticity case, 
pdipm a5 s 2 AT**. 
The pd(S) and pm(S) functions are depicted in Fig. 9. Hence, for small S, 
pd < pm. 
We can also be precise about the length of time the duopolists share the 
market, for the case of constant elasticity. Integrating (1 1),23 we obtain: 
- rt 
pw = (1 - 1$(2 - l/E) + 2 “l,, (t Q O), 
where we measure t from the date of exhaustion of the resource (i.e., 
P(o)=lvu - l/E)). 
Solving for the value of t, f, at which p = IT, we obtain 
t^= (2/r) In(1 - l/s). 
Since 8/p is lower with duopoly then with monopoly, and since for 
*’ Equation (11) is a simple linear differential equation: 
d = rp - k, 
Pr where k =----. 
2-l/& 
Hence 
ln(rp - k) = rt + c^,, 
rp-k=c,e’[, 
rp = c,erf + k. 
I f  at I = 0, p =p/(l - l/e), then 
rF 
-=c, fk 
1 - 1/E 
or 
[ 1 1 c,=rxi I-1/E -- 2--1/E I 
= (1 - I,$2 - l/E)’ 





S l * S 
FIGURE 9 
S < S**, pd(S) <p”(S), it is immediate that for S < S**, the date of 
exhaustion is later than for monopoly. For S > S**, pd(S) > p”(S), and 
p < 1, and hence the time taken to deplete the stock to S** is greater for 
duopoly than for monopoly. 
We summarize with 
PROPOSITION 5b.24 (i) If S, is small, p: < pf < py, all t. 
(ii) ge’ = 0, there exists an S**, such that 
Pd(S) i PYS) as SsS**. 
Moreover 
pd(S**) > p; 
and 
pd(S) > p”(S) for all S, 
the duopoly price exceeds the socially optimal price. 
(iii) If&’ = 0, 
The date of innovation is earlier and the date of exhaustion later than in 
either the socially optimal allocation or the monopoly. 
(iv) If M:(S) z p( 1 - (1 -,u)/c), the marginal revenue of the 
resources owner when the stock is S under the duopoly structure, then 
I4 Assuming throughout that v  ( (E - I)/&. 
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M:(S) > M”(S) for all S such that pd(S) > max(p”(S),p). In addition, 
M:‘(S) > M”(S) for all S such that pd > 2&p/2& - l.*’ For small S, the 
marginal revenue from an extra unit of the resource is higher under the 
duopoly market structure than under monopoly even though the price is 
lower. Thus, incentives for exploration will be greater in this environment; 
indeed, for all pd > P(~E/(~E - l)), 
the marginal private return to additional resources exceeds the cost of 
production of the substitute, so there will be more exploration than is socially 
optimal. 
It should be clear that what is essential for most of the analysis of this 
section is that there are only a “few” producers of the substitute and a “few” 
owners of the natural resource. The assumption of only two firms is not 
critical to the analysis. 
8. A STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE DUOPOLY PROBLEM 
In Section 7, we have explored a particular set of assumptions concerning 
the behavior of the two duopolists, that they behave in a Nash-Cournot way, 
taking the quantities sold by their competitors as given. This is not the only 
(or even necessarily the most persuasive) set of behavioral hypotheses. 
Elsewhere in this paper in discussing the behavior of a monopolist dealing 
with a large set of competitors we have employed an alternative assumption: 
that the monopolist knows the reaction of the competitors to any action 
which he undertakes; he finds the point along their “reaction function” at 
which his profits are maximized (see also Stiglitz [25]). When both the 





e-M”‘= 2E-- - PdV) - E 
For pd > ~&J$?E - 1, 




E P”G-y nP=P. 
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substitute and the resource are controlled by different monopolists, there is 
no natural “leader’‘-they would both appear to be equally powerful, and it 
for this reason that we have focused here on the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. 
If the patent owner acts as the Stackelberg leader, and the resource owner 
is the follower, then it is obvious that (with a constant elasticity demand 
function), the equilibrium is identical to that described in Section 5 where the 
patent owner maximized his profit against a competitive resource owner. 
Since the resource owner controlled the market prior to the invention, it 
seems, however, more natural to treat him as the Stackelberg leader. If the 
producer of the substitute takes the quantity supplied by the resource owner 
as given, his marginal revenue is (as before) 
which he sets equal to his marginal cost, ~7. Letting 
Q, = ,uQ = output of resource owner 
we can rewrite the marginal revenue = marginal cost equilibrium condition 
as 
Q,=; [j-p (d)]Q. 
Equation (13) can be viewed as the demand function facing the resource 
owner. Differentiating, we obtain 
or 






P(1 - l/E) 
P --PC1 - l/E) 1 
P aQ, 1 +E + PC1 - l/E) 
B-PV - l/E) 
[FE +p(2 - l/E - E)] 
=p P(l+&)-p(&-1) . (14) 
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This must increase at the rate of interest, so 
$=rp ir 1+_ PPU - l/E) (PE +p(2 - l/E - E))(P(l + E) - I)(& - 1)) I < rp. 
As in the Stackelberg case analyzed earlier there is a kink in the demand 
schedule facing the resource owner. When Q, is sufficiently large that p < ~7, 
marginal revenue is p( 1 - I/E). But at p slightly above p, marginal revenue 
equals 
which is larger. Thus, the equilibrium path consists of four phases (for S 
sufftciently large) (see Fig. 10). 
(a) for 0 < t < T,, fi/p = r, only resource owner produces; 
(b) for T, < t < T,, p = p, only resource owner produces; 
(c) for T, < t < T3, b/p < r, both produce; 
(d) for t > T,, p = pm, only substitute is produced. 
Price is continuous throughout. T, and T2 are such that 
eprcrZeT1) = (1 - l/&)/(1 - l/2&). 
The remainder of this analysis proceeds as before, e.g., for small S, 
pd <pm. The details of the analysis are left as an exercise to the reader. 
The patent owner could, of course, take the price set by the resource 
owner as given; in that case, if p exceeds fl, the substitute would be produced 
and drive out the resource. The resource owner recognizing this will solve 
exactly the same problem as we described in Section 6: he maximizes his 
revenue subject to the constraint that p < j?, and all the results reported there 
apply here as well. 
FIG. 10. (a) Price dynamics for Stackelberg duopoly. (b) Discontinuity in marginal revenue. 
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Thus, as in so much of oligopoly, the precise character of this market 
equilibrium appears to be very sensitive to the behavioral assumptions 
postulated. 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have attempted to extend the theory of monopolistic 
competition to an intertemporal setting. The theory in a general context is 
likely to be extremely complicated. No doubt that is why there have been so 
few attempts. We have cast the problems in the context of resource depletion 
in the presence of a new technology precisely because it offers strong 
qualitative results. 
At issue was the manner in which “the market” would exploit an 
exhaustible resource with no extraction costs when there exists a substitute 
with an infinitely elastic supply. We have known, at least since the time of 
Cournot, that imperfectly competitive markets can support technologies of 
varying efftciency. Except for the polar cases of perfect competition and pure 
monopoly the best practice technique is generally not the only technique in 
use at an equilibrium. An intertemporal generalization of this was obtained 
for the duopoly models of Sections 7 and 8 and the Stackelberg equilibrium 
of Section 5. Interestingly enough, though, in each of the remaining cases 
that we analyzed, the market was found to be rational in the sense that 
resource exhaustion was found to precede innovation; the new technology 
takes over only when the natural resource is no longer available. This is, of 
course, not to say that the period of use of the natural resource is optimal 
in imperfect markets. It is possible to say a good deal about the biases 
that result, and they have been stated as Propositions lb-5b. It should be 
clear that our analysis is directly relevant to the question of the manner in 
which firms under perfect or imperfect competition physically depreciate 
their fixed capital by choosing the intensity with which to use their 
machinery. 
The general presumption of excessive conservationism (Stiglitz [25]) on 
the part of monopoly is sustained, and extended to other imperfectly 
competitive environments. The widespread view that pure monopolies delay 
innovation is also supported. But considerable doubt is cast on the view that 
“limited competition” economies lie between the polar forms of perfect 
competition and perfect monopoly. In two models of limited competition, the 
market is even more conservationist than pure monopoly and innovation 
occurs earlier than in pure competition; while in one model exhaustion of the 
resource under limited competition occurs even later than in pure monopoly. 
The results are summarized, for the case of constant elasticity demand 
functions, in Figs. lla and llb. 
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a b 
FIG. 11. (a) Price comparisons. (b) Comparison of dates of innovation. 
These results have important further implications: we have already drawn 
attention to the likely biases in exploratory activity which will occur in the 
various market structures studied. Elsewhere, we explore the implications for 
the patterns of extraction prior to invention and for the incentives for 
invention itself.26 
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3a 
We wish to maximize 
i 
f2 
Maxrc= D(p’(t)) j(t) e-” dl 
0 
-“D(J(t)) df -~oSo + ewrf2V, (A.11 





L@(t)) dt = So. (A.31 
0 
I6 See Stiglitz and Dasgupta [ 271 and Stiglitz et al. (281. 
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There are two cases to consider: 
(i) Elasticity constant or increasing with Q. Then the constraint (A.2) 
is binding, and we have 
p(t) = Foerf for O<t<T,, (A.4) 
p(F2) = $oeri‘2 = &. (A.5) 
Hence differentiating (A.3) with respect to PO, we obtain 
_ dF?;, 
p. dp’ = -1” D’J dt/D(p”(F,)) = 
J-f1 cD(a dt 
0 0 WF(Fc,)) * 
Thus 
$-=f*(D’j+D)dt+e~“l$-D(j(~,)) 
ii1 .sD(jj) dt 
0 0 WVJ) 
-,So-~f; D’dt 
=,,o’lD [I --E (1 --& )]dt-So+j-;;D(l-+$))dt 
=- I---&-)dt+f; D (l-e (I-$))dt. 
At f, = fz, p’,erfl > p, and &/apo < 0. 
At PO = pf,, the socially optimal price, jioerP1 = p, 
Since p’ < p& = p/( 1 - l/c), 
iD (1-e (1-$))dt>jD[l-s(l-(l-l/E))]dt=O. 
Hence 
Hence Jo > pf, but PO < pr. 
(ii) Elasticity decreasing with Q. This is the case for which a 
monopolist would increase his price at a rate less than the rate of interest. 
We have to show that it is never profitable for the patent owner to buy the 
resource from the competitors and thus increase his price at a rate less than 
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the rate of interest. Assume it were, and let the price path j((t) be the optimal 









Consider the new price path, B(t), 
but 
b(t) = $(j+l) e-r(P1-t) < p(t) 
for all r > 0, 
for all 0 < t < Fr. 
Clearly 
1 T’ d(t) Qemrt dt = p^(O) So. 0 
Since f, < ?;, , the patent owner could have paid $. > p. for the resource, 







o (p’(pl + z) -p) Qedrrd 
> e-rT, *  - (p(T, + 5) -p) Qedrr df 
Thus p’ could not have been optimal. 
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4a 
We wish to 
maximize 7r = jr’ D(p(t))p(t) e-” dt + jr’@(~) e-” dt s.t. 
(P(t).Tt.Td 0 Tl 
(B-1) 
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p(t) < P, (B4 
r” D(p(t)) dt t [‘*D(p) dt = S,. 
There are two cases to consider: (i) The elasticity of demand is constant,” 
and (ii) the elasticity of demand varies with Q. 
In the former case, 
p(t) = peer’. (B.4) 
Then we have a single control variable, p,,, with which we are concerned: 
since (with elasticity greater than unity, constraint (B.2) will also be binding 
at Td 
p(T,) = poerrl = p, 
dT, 1 
-po dp, = -7’ 
and, from (B.3) 
dTz PO dp = -jr’ D’p dt/D(p). 
0 0 
Hence 
-$ 0 = jr’ 0 (D’p t D) dt +j?D(& eprT2 2 0 
=i 
TI 
D(l -c)dt ++I’ &D(p) dt. 




If T, = T,, poerT2 = j, and 
D dt > 0. 
Hence T, > T,. 
At T, = 0, dn/dpo = 0. 
*’ Or it increases with Q, but there is speculation SO d Inp/dt is restricted to be less than or 
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Differentiating 7c again, we have, at T, = 0, 
D(l-E)SJ- 
p. err2 
if erTz > E/(E - 1). Hence, if So is small, p. = p; if So is large, p. < jL 
The case with E not constant is somewhat more subtle. To establish this 
result we use a perturbation argument. It is easy to show that during (0, T,) 
where R’ = marginal revenue. 
Clearly, the cartel is indifferent between selling an extra unit at any date 
between 0 and T,. In the profit-maximizing equilibrium, it must be indif- 
ferent between selling a unit just before T,, reducing the present discounted 
value of revenue by 
R’(Q) eerT1 
and selling a unit more just beyond T,, which raises the (present discounted 
value of) revenue by 
pe - r=z. 
Hence 
R’(Q) e- r=~ = pee-r=, 
or 
e -r(=z-=I) = 1 _ L 
E’ 





Po=P (Qo = 8). 
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APPENDIX C: DERIVATION OF DUOPOLY DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION 
Rewrite (lob) as 
p(2 - l/E - (1 -p/E)) = p. 
From (9a) we thus obtain 
MR=p(2- l/&)--p 
so 
Jq2 - l/E) +pE’Q/E2 = 
p(2 - l/E) -p ry 
or since 
&'Q 8 d --=---VW 
e2Q P 
we have 
$[2 - l/E -V] 
p(2 - l/E) -p = r. 
APPENDIX D : PROOF THAT pd >< p” 
AS S,< S** IF E'=O (CONSTANT ELASTICITY OF DEMAND) 
Solve (12) for pd = pd(S) and (12’) for pm =pm(S). Since both functions 
are monotonic, they can be inverted. Define 
s1= (pd)-’ (P), 
s2 = (Pm)-’ (PI, 
A=S1-Ss,. 
Then using (lob) and (11)” 
** From (lob), p = ~p/p - (E - 1). From (11), W = 1 -p/PC2 -a). 
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D [P--(1-4/~-l 
rp 1 -j7x/(2 -a) 1 
D [jx (++&)-+I =-- rp 1 -px/2 -a 
where x = l/p, a = l/c. Hence, if X= l/p 
dA 
[ 
x - (1 -a/2)2 2xE+‘k 
dx= (2-up-x ar’ 1 
At p = ji, x = X, and x - (1 - a/2)f = a.f/2. 
Atp=p*=$/(l-a),x=(l-a).C,and 
x - (1 - a/2)3 = +X/2. 
Hence, since A = 0 at x = (1 - a)& letting z = 2(1 - a/2)‘.f’k/ar, 
since 
dx 
It is also immediate that since 
dA 
-50 dx 
as x z (1 - a/2)/& 
there exists a unique x*, (1 - a&C < x* < X, such that 
A(x*) = 0. 
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Moreover x* > (1 - a/2)2. This implies that there exists a unique value of S 
for which pd = pm, and that the two are equal at a value of p > j% Hence, 
since for p ( p the price differential equations are the same, there exists a 
unique S** such that pd(S) i pm(S) as S >< S**. 
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